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THE ONE-YEAR LIMIT ON REMOVAL: AN ACE UP
THE SLEEVE OF THE UNSCRUPULOUS
LITIGANT?
INTRODUCTION
Consider this scenario: Plaintiff, a resident of Georgia, sues two
defendants.' One defendant is a resident of Georgia, and the other
defendant is a resident of Florida. 2 When the plaintiff files the
lawsuit, the plaintiff knows the damages will exceed the $75,000
minimum amount in controversy required for removal to federal
court.3 However, the plaintiff states in the initial state court petition
that the amount in controversy will be less than $75,000 but, after the
one year statutory limit for removal has passed, plaintiff increases the
amount in controversy to over $75,000 and dismisses the non-diverse
defendant.4 Defendant immediately attempts to remove to federal
court, but the one-year time limit on removal already expired. 5
Should the defendant be allowed to remove despite the one-year time
limit?
6
Alternatively, assume that the plaintiff has a valid claim against the
Georgia resident, but unbeknownst to the defendant, the plaintiff has
no intention of pursuing the claim.7 Should the defendant be allowed
to remove after the one-year time limit has expired?
8
As indicated by the above examples, "[i]t is no secret that plaintiffs
often deliberately structure their state court lawsuits to prevent
removal by defendants to federal court."9 The reason plaintiffs try to
prevent defendants from removing to federal court is because,
1. See generally Foster v. Landon, No. 04-2645, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22440 (E.D. La. Nov. 3
2004).
2. ld
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. See generally Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co., 298 F. Supp. 422 (W.D. La. 2003).
8. See discussion infra Part IV.
9. Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The Improper Party Problem in
Removal Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REv. 779,781 (2006).
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statistically, plaintiffs are more likely to win the case if it is tried in
state court.' 
0
Several jurisdictions have considered whether plaintiffs should be
allowed to prevent removal through the use of strategic joinder or
fraudulent joinder." Strategic joinder occurs when a plaintiff joins a
party, but has no intention of pursuing his or her claim against the
party. 12 In contrast, fraudulent joinder occurs when the plaintiff joins
a party against whom he or she has no claim. 13 Courts disagree about
the ability of a plaintiff to successfully prevent a defendant from
removing by strategically or fraudulently joining a party.14
More importantly, courts remain split on the issue of whether the
one-year time limit on removal stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is
subject to an equitable exception or whether it is an absolute bar to
removal after one year from commencement of the action. 15 Courts
allowing an equitable exception focus on the fairness of allowing a
defendant to remove compared to the unfairness of allowing a
plaintiff to manipulate the forum. 16 In contrast, courts interpreting the
one-year time limit as an absolute bar focus on the plain language of
the statute, the legislative reasoning behind the limitation, and
Congress's ability to amend the statute if it so desires.
17
This Note advocates adopting an equitable exception to the one-
year limit on removal when a plaintiff joins a party, but has no
intention of pursuing his or her claim against the party.' 8 Conversely,
this Note advocates an absolute bar on removal after one year from
10. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About
the Legal System? Win Rates & Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 606-07 (1998)
[hereinafter Win Rates & Removal] (finding that removal in diversity cases reduces the plaintiffs' odds
of winning from approximately even to about 39%, concluding that "[t]he residual 11% reduction
represents the impact of forum.").
11. See discussion infra Part Il1.
12. See discussion infra Part HI.D.
13. See discussion infra Part HI.C.
14. See discussion infra Part IV.
15. See discussion infra Part HI.
16. E. Kyle McNew, Are Rules Meant To Be Broken? The One-Year Two-Step in Tedford v. Warner-
Lambert Co., 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1315, 1344 (2005).
17. Id. at 1345.
18. See discussion infra Part V.
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THE ONE-YEAR LIMIT ON REMOVAL
commencement of the action when the plaintiff joins a party against
whom he or she has no claim. 19 Part I describes the ability of a
defendant to remove to federal court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. 2 0 Part II describes the history of the one-year limit on
removal and interprets the relevant language included in the statute.21
Part III discusses joinder of parties, including permissive joinder,
compulsory joinder, fraudulent joinder, and strategic joinder.22 Part
IV examines various interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), focusing
on whether the one-year limitation on removal is absolute or whether
an equitable exception to the time limit is possible in certain
23
situations. Finally, Part V encourages the United States Supreme
Court to allow an equitable exception to the one-year time limitation
in cases of strategic joinder while discouraging an equitable
exception in cases of fraudulent joinder.24
I. REMOVAL BASED ON DIVERSITY JURISDICTION: 28 U.S.C. § 1332
Defendants are allowed to remove an action from state court to
federal court when diversity exists and the amount in controversy
requirement is met. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 gives federal courts the power
to adjudicate diversity cases. 26 However, this statute is subject to
strict construction so that the power of state courts to decide their
own controversies is not intruded upon.27 Strict construction requires
that removal only be allowed in clearly defined circumstances.
28
19. See discussion infra Part V.
20. See discussion infra Part 1.
21. See discussion infra Part II.
22. See discussion infra Part 111.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.
24. See discussion infra Part V.
25. See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.03 (3d ed. 2006); and 28
U.S.C. §1332(a) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
27. City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941).
28. See id. at 77.
20081 1075
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A. Defining Diversity
Two types of diversity exist.29 The first type, complete diversity,
exists when "all plaintiffs are from different states from all
defendants." 30 The second type, minimal diversity, only requires that
"one plaintiff be a citizen of a different state from that of at least one
defendant." 31 In most cases, complete diversity is required for a
federal court to hear a case. 32 However, under some circumstances, a
federal court has jurisdiction to hear a case despite the fact that only
minimal diversity is present.
33
B. Purpose ofAllowing Removal in Diversity Cases
One main reason for allowing removal in diversity cases is to
alleviate the danger of prejudice to out-of-state residents in a foreign
state court that the out-of-state resident might not otherwise
encounter in their own local courts. 34 State judges are elected and
have closer ties to their community; this creates the potential to
influence the judges to make decisions favoring their local
community.35 Federal courts do not have the same tie to a local
community, so they are more neutral when making decisions.3
6
Overall, diversity jurisdiction provides a neutral forum for the parties
and helps avoid dangers of prejudice to defendants in out-of-state
courts.3 7
29. See 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102.12 (3d ed. 2006).
30. Id. (emphasis in original).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(2005).
34. Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1125-26 (6th Cir. 1973); Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924
F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1991); see also John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE
L.J. 7, 12 (1963). See generally John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 403 (1979).
35. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, P.L. No. 109-2 § 2(a)(4)(B), 119 Stat 4, 5 (2005).
36. Id.
37. China Basin Props., Ltd. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 1301, 1304 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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II. THE ONE-YEAR LIMIT ON REMOVAL: 28 U.S.C. § 1446
Despite courts allowing defendants to remove diversity cases to
federal court, "a case may not be removed ... more than 1 year after
commencement of the action.'
38
A. History of the Statute
A one-year limitation on removal did not always exist.39 Before
enacting the one-year time limit, defendants could remove to federal
court at any time during the course of the proceedings. 40 However, in
1988, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) to include a one-year
time limitation on removal.41 This limitation imposed barriers that
prevent defendants from removing at any time during the case.42
B. Purpose ofAmendments to the Statute
There are many reasons for the amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1446.43
As discussed by Congress, the amendment was enacted in order to
"reduc[e] the opportunity for removal after substantial progress has
been made in state court" because "[r]emoval late in the proceedings
may result in substantial delay and disruption."" Another purpose of
the amendment was to reduce the number of cases over which federal
courts have jurisdiction. 45  Through enacting the amendment,
Congress expected a "modest curtailment in access to diversity
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000).
39. See Russaw v. Voyager Life Ins. Co., 921 F. Supp. 723, 725 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (indicating that 28
U.S.C. § 1446 was amended to include a one-year limit on removal).
40. William D. Underwood, Survey Article: Civil Procedure, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 587, 601
(2004).
41. Id. at602.
42. See id. at 601-02.
43. See Kite v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 761 F. Supp. 597, 599 (S.D. Ind. 1989); see
also H.R. Rep No. 100-889 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 USCCAN 5982, 6032-33.
44. H.R. Rep. No. 100-889 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 USCCAN 5982, 6032-33; see also Kite,
761 F. Supp. at 599 (indicating that the purpose of the amendment was to "prevent[] potential
manipulation and forum shopping by defendants who are either attempting to delay proceedings by
removing at the last second prior to trial, although removal was available earlier, or attempting to find a
more friendly forum after substantial progress has been made in the State forum.").
45. Ferguson v. Security Life of Denver Ins. Co., 996 F. Supp. 597, 601 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
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jurisdiction., 46  However, "Congress wanted to reduce the
opportunity for removal, not eliminate it entirely., 47
C. Interpreting the Statute
In order to properly interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1446, the following two
issues must be addressed: when an action is "commenced" and when
the one-year limitation applies.48 The first issue to determine is when
the action "commenced. ' '49 Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a
complaint with the court." 50 Courts agree that an action commences
on the date the action is filed in court.51
Second, courts must determine when the one-year limitation
applies.52 The majority of courts addressing this issue have stated that
the one-year limitation only applies in cases that were not initially
removable to federal court.53 However, a minority of courts have
found that the one-year limitation applies no matter when the case
became removable. 5
4
After interpreting the meaning of the literal language of the statute
and interpreting when the statute's one-year limitation comes into
46. H.R. Rep. No. 100-889 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 USCCAN 5982, 6032.
47. Ferguson, 996 F. Supp. at 601; see also Kite, 761 F. Supp. at 600 (making it clear that the rule
was not intended to "circumvent diversity jurisdiction altogether" because this would encourage
plaintiffs to join non-diverse defendants in order to force adjudication of the case in state court)
(emphasis in original).
48. See Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 422, 425 (W.D. La. 2003) (interpreting when
an action is commenced); see also Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 534 (6th
Cir. 1998) (interpreting when the time limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) applies).
49. See id. at 425 (interpreting "commencement" before discussing whether an equitable exception
applies to the one-year limitation on removal).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
51. See, e.g., Ardoin, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 425.
52. See Brierly, 184 F.3d at 534 (discussing that the one-year time limitation to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
applies to cases "not initially removable"); see also Brown v. Tokio Marine Fire Ins. Co., 284 F.3 87 1,
873 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that the one-year limitation period only applies to cases not removable to
federal court when initially filed).
53. See, e.g., Brown v. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., Ltd., 284 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir. 2002);
Johnson v. Heublein, Inc., 227 F.3d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 2000); Brierly, 184 F.3d at 534-35; New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 886 (5th Cir. 1998); Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d
1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
54. SeeMartine v. Nat'l Tea Co., 841 F. Supp. 1421, 1422 (M.D. La. 1993).
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play, courts can determine whether the statute imposes an absolute
bar on removal after one year or whether the statute allows an
equitable exception to the one-year time limitation.55
III. DESCRIPTION OF JOINDER
A. Permissive Joinder
Permissive joinder "is often called the joinder of 'proper
parties. ' ' '56 Permissive joinder allows a plaintiff to join parties to a
suit as long as two requirements are met.57 First, the claims must
"aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences." 58 Second, the claims must present a
common question of law or fact. 59 However, even if these two
requirements are met, Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure states only that the plaintiff may join a party, it does not
require it.
60
B. Compulsory Joinder
Compulsory joinder requires that certain parties be joined to the
suit. 6  A plaintiff is required to join a party to the suit in two
62situations. First, a plaintiff is required to join a person as a party to
the suit if "in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete
relief among existing parties. 63 Second, a plaintiff must join a person
as a party to the suit if "that person claims an interest relating to the
55. See generally Ardoin, 298 F, Supp. 2d 422 (defining commencement before determining that an
equitable exception was allowed to the one-year limitation on removal); Brierly, 184 F.3d 527
(determining that the one-year time limitation on removal applies only to cases not initially removable
before determining whether the one-year limitation on removal applied to the case).
56. 4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 20.02 (3d ed. 2006) (citing FED. R.
Civ. P. 20(a)).
57. See FED. R. Crv. P. 20(a)(1).
58. Id. at 20(a)(l)(A).
59. Id. at 20(a)(l)(B).
60. Id.
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
62. Id. at 19(a)(l).
63. Id. at 19(a)(l)(A).
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subject of the action and is so situated that the disposing of the action
in the person's absence may" either "impair or impede the person's
ability to protect the interest" or cause a person who is already a party
to be at "risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations." 64 If either of these requirements are met and a plaintiff
65refuses to join the party, the court will join the party anyway.
C. Fraudulent Joinder
Courts define fraudulent joinder in different ways. 66 Some courts
say that fraudulent joinder occurs if the plaintiff joined a party solely
to defeat removal.67 Other courts say that fraudulent joinder occurs
when the plaintiff pleads false jurisdictional facts.68 Still other courts
say that fraudulent joinder occurs if the plaintiff procedurally
misjoined a non-diverse party to prevent removal. 69 Despite different
definitions of fraudulent joinder, in all cases of fraudulent joinder, the
plaintiff has no claim against the fraudulently joined defendant. 70
Not only do courts define fraudulent joinder in different ways,
courts also use various standards to determine if a defendant can
64. Id. at 19(a)(1)(B).
65. Id. at 19(a)(2).
66. E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Civil Cases to Federal Court Based on
Fraudulent Joinder, 91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 194 (2005).
67. Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904, 907-10 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that
the non-diverse defendant was joined solely to defeat removal, based on evidence that there was no
claim against the non-diverse defendant and the non-diverse defendant was not involved in the dispute
between the plaintiff and the diverse defendant.); Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 73-74 (7th
Cir. 1992) (finding that the joinder of a non-diverse defendant was fraudulent because the plaintiff had
no chance of recovering damages from him as no impropriety was alleged against him).
68. Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (finding that fraudulent joinder did not
occur because the defendant seeking removal did not meet the burden of showing that the plaintiff pled
false jurisdictional facts); B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549, 555 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding
that fraudulent joinder did not occur because the plaintiff did not plead false jurisdictional facts against
at least one of the non-diverse defendants).
69. Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11 th Cir. 1996) (finding that fraudulent
joinder occurred because non-diverse defendants were procedurally misjoined when they had no real
connection with the controversy); Greene v. Wyeth, 344 F. Supp. 2d 674, 685 (D. Nev. 2004) (finding
that fraudulent joinder occurred when the non-diverse defendants were not properly joined under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
70. See infra footnotes 71-75 (indicating that fraudulent joinder occurs anytime when there is no
claim against the non-diverse defendant).
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prove fraudulent joinder.71 Some courts require that the defendant
prove there was no reasonable basis for the claim against the non-
diverse party when the action was filed.72 Some courts require that
the defendant show there is no possibility that the plaintiff will
recover from the non-diverse party.73 Other courts require that the
defendant show there is no reasonable possibility that the plaintiff
will recover from the non-diverse party.74 Some courts require that
the defendant show that the plaintifffailed to state a claim against the
non-diverse party.75 Similar to the court's definitions of fraudulent
joinder, all of the tests for fraudulent joinder require the removing
defendant to carry the burden of showing that the plaintiff has no
claim against the fraudulently joined, non-diverse defendant. 76
71. Percy, supra note 66, at 194.
72. Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 811 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that fraudulent joinder
was not present because a reasonable basis for predicting liability existed against the non-diverse
defendants for the plaintiffs personal injuries when the defendants were a business that could have
warned of the dangerous conditions existing near their place of business); Boyer v. Snap-On Tools,
Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that fraudulent joinder was not present because the
plaintiff had colorable claims against the non-diverse defendants in a breach of contract action when
they were negligent in assessing the potential profitability of a business).
73. Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that fraudulent joinder
was not present because there was at least some possibility that the plaintiff could recover from the non-
diverse, government defendant in a tort action); Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461
(2d Cir. 1998) (finding that a plaintiff fraudulently joined a non-diverse, corporate parent of the
company plaintiff worked for in an employment action for discriminatory discharge because the plaintiff
had no possibility of recovering from the defendant since the defendant had no control over the working
conditions or the employment practices at the company).
74. Gray v. Beverly Enters.-Miss., Inc., 390 F.3d 400, 409 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that fraudulent
joinder was not present because the plaintiff showed evidence strong enough to demonstrate a
reasonable possibility of recovery against the non-diverse defendant who could have been a participant
in tortious conduct since they failed to remedy conduct by their subordinates which caused injury to the
plaintiff); Poulos, supra note 67, at 73 (finding that fraudulent joinder was established because the non-
diverse defendant was a parent corporation and could not be held liable for its subsidiary's actions;
therefore, there was no reasonable possibility that the plaintiff could recover from the non-diverse
defendant).
75. Polyplastics, Inc. v. Transconex, Inc., 713 F.2d 875, 877 (1st Cir. 1983); Ritchey, supra note 53,
at 1318-19 (finding that fraudulent joinder was present because the plaintiff failed to state a claim
against the non-diverse defendants when the non-diverse defendants could assert statute of limitations
and res judicata defenses in order to avoid being parties in the suit); Hill v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., 386
F. Supp. 2d 427, 430-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that fraudulent joinder was established because the
plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant in a tort action
where the sole remedy available to an employee injured in the course of employment was a worker's
compensation claim).
76. See also supra notes 72-75. See generally Omi's Custard Co. v. Relish This, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60016 (S.D. I11., Aug. 24, 2006).
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D. Strategic Joinder
Another tactic commonly used by plaintiffs in order to defeat
removal to federal court is strategic joinder.77 Courts agree that
strategic joinder occurs when the plaintiff has a viable claim against a
non-diverse defendant, but has no intention of pursuing the claim.
78
In cases of strategic joinder, the plaintiff's only reason for joining the
non-diverse party is to prevent removal to federal court.79 Plaintiffs
often deliberately manipulate the forum in this way to prevent
defendants from removing a case to federal court.
80
IV. COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1446
Not every court has interpreted the one-year time limit on
removal. 81  However, courts who have addressed the one-year
limitation remain split.82 In fact, even courts within the same circuit
are sometimes split.83 Some courts allow an equitable exception to
the one-year time limit, while others treat the one-year time limit on
removal as an absolute bar to removal after one year.
84
77. See Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CAm. U. L. REv. 609, 645-48
(2004) (discussing the use of token defendants to prevent removal).
78. See Cofer v. Horsehead Research & Development Co., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D. Tenn.
1991) (suggesting that a plaintiff can attempt to avoid removal by joining a defendant they do not intend
to sue, but who is arguably liable); see also Haiber, supra note 77, at 645-46 (stating that "it is not
unusual for a plaintiff to name as a defendant a party from whom the plaintiff has no intention of
seeking any recovery", nor is it unusual for a plaintiff to "defeat removal by finding a friendly,
impecunious, or disinterested non-diverse defendant and then waiting until after the one-year expiration
before dismissing that defendant.").
79. See Haiber, supra note 77, at 645-48 (discussing various ways to prevent removal).
80. Hines & Gensler, supra note 9, at 781.
81. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
82. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B (showing that courts in the 7th Circuit allow an equitable
exception, whereas courts in the 4th Circuit and the 10th Circuit treat the one-year time limitation as an
absolute bar).
83. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B (showing that some courts in the 5th Circuit allow an equitable
exception to the one-year limit on removal, while other courts in the 5th Circuit treat the one-year
limitation as an absolute bar).
84. Compare Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 426-28 (5th Cir. 2003) with Mantz v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10123 at *5 (S.D. W. Va., June 13, 2003).
1082 [Vol. 24:4
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A. Allowing an Equitable Exception to the One-Year Limitation
Several courts allow an equitable exception to the one-year time
limitation imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).85 Courts consider various
factors when deciding if an equitable exception should apply.86 Most
courts allowing an equitable exception discuss how fairness to the
defendant requires allowing a defendant to remove in proper cases
and how it is unfair for the plaintiff to manipulate the forum.8
7
1. Cases in the Fifth Circuit
The leading case allowing an equitable exception to the one-year
limitation is Tedford v. Warner-Lambert.88 In Tedford, the plaintiffs
joined a non-diverse defendant after they were notified that the
original defendant intended to remove to federal court.89 A few days
before the one-year limitation on removal ran, the plaintiff dismissed
the non-diverse defendant. 90 The defendant attempted removal for a
second time only ten days after the one-year limitation on removal
had run.91 The Fifth Circuit allowed an equitable exception to the
one-year time limit on removal, reasoning that the defendants
vigilantly worked to try the case in federal court because they sought
removal each time the opportunity arose.
92
Several other Fifth Circuit cases have agreed with Tedford,
allowing an equitable exception to the one-year limitation on
removal.93 For example, in Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co., the Western
85. Amy D. Harmon, Equitable Considerations in Removal: Is One Year the Final Answer?, 16 S.
CAROLINA LAWYER 28, 30 (2004).
86. See Hill, supra note 75, at 431 (indicating that courts weigh "the plaintiff's behavior, the fairness
to the defendant of allowing or denying the extension, and the systemic interest in efficiency and respect
for state courts.").
87. McNew, supra note 16, at 1344.
88. Tedford, 327 F.3d at 423.
89. Id. at 425.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 428.
93. See Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 422, 429 (W.D. La. 2003); Morrow v. Wyeth,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43194, at *21 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Morrison v. Nat'l Benefit Life Ins. Co., 889 F.
Supp. 945, 950 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
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District of Louisiana allowed an equitable exception to the one-year
limitation on removal when plaintiffs began dismissing non-diverse
defendants after one year had lapsed.94 In Ardoin, evidence showed
that the plaintiff deliberately joined non-diverse defendants and left
them as parties to the suit until one year passed for the purpose of
defeating diversity and preventing removal.95 The court reasoned that
the "plaintiffs' efforts to avoid removal to federal court, if successful,
would undermine the purpose of diversity jurisdiction." 96 Moreover,
the Congressional concern that substantial progress is made in state
court after one-year was not present in the case because any
discovery already conducted was transferable to another court.
9 7
Additionally, courts in the Fifth Circuit have allowed an equitable
exception to the time limit on removal when the court finds that the
plaintiff engaged in bad faith forum manipulation. 98 For instance, in
Morrow v. Wyeth, the Southern District of Texas allowed an
equitable exception to the one-year limit on removal when the
plaintiff specifically requested that the defendants not be served
within one year from commencement of the action.99 The court
focused on the fact that this constituted bad faith forum
manipulation. 00 Additionally, in Morrison v. National Benefit Life
Insurance Co., the Southern District of Mississippi allowed an
equitable exception to the one-year time limit on removal when the
plaintiff sought to increase the amount in controversy over the
statutory minimum for diversity jurisdiction just seven days after the
one year limit ended. 10 1 The court reasoned that failing to claim the
proper amount of damages from the beginning constituted bad faith
because the sole reason for doing so was to avoid removal within the
one-year time limit.'
0 2
94. Ardoin, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
95. Id. at 428,
96. Id. at 429.
97. Id. at 428.
98. See id. at 428-29; Morrow, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43194, at *21.
99. Morrow, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43194, at *20-21.
100. Id. at *21.
101. Morrison v. Nat'l Benefit Life Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 945, 947 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
102. Id. at950.
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2. Cases in the Seventh Circuit
Additionally, a Seventh Circuit court has allowed an equitable
exception to the one-year time limit on removal. 103 In Kite v. Richard
Wolf Medical Instruments, Corp., a case with facts similar to Tedford,
the Southern District of Indiana allowed removal after one-year from
commencing the action because the defendant had initially removed
to federal court within one year and sought removal again only one
month after the diversity-destroying party was dismissed. 10 4 The
court reasoned that if courts were to grant remands in cases where the
defendant seeks removal immediately after the diversity-destroying
defendant is dismissed, it would "encourage plaintiffs to manipulate
the removal process and undermine Congressional intent to provide a
federal forum to defendants who expediently seek removal to federal
court .... ,,105
B. Enforcing an Absolute Bar to Removal After One Year
Several courts treat the one-year time limitation imposed in 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b) as an absolute bar to removal after one year.'0 6
Courts that treat the time limitation as an absolute bar discuss the
plain language of the statute, the reasons behind the limitation, and
Congress's ability to amend the statute if it so desires.' 0
7
1. Cases in the Fourth Circuit
Cases in the Fourth Circuit have held that "the plain language of
the statute and its legislative history preclude application of equitable
103. See Kite v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments, Corp., 761 F. Supp. 597, 601 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
104. Compare id. at 598, 601, with Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 424-25, 428-29
(5th Cir. 2003).
105. Kite, 761 F. Supp. at 601.
106. See Mantz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10123, at *5 (S.D. W. Va.
2003); Wilder v. Isuzu, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37341, at *8 (Dist. Ct. S.C. 2006); Hedges v.
Hedges Gauging Service, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 753, 755 (M.D. La. 1993); Jenkins v. Sandoz
Pharmaceuticals Corp., 965 F. Supp. 861, 869 (N.D. Miss. 1997); Caudill v. Ford Motor Co., 271 F.
Supp. 2d 1324, 1327 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
107. McNew, supra note 16, at 1343-45.
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exceptions. ' 1 8 For instance, in Mantz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co., the court found an absolute bar to the one-year
limitation on removal when a defendant's second attempt at removal,
based on fraudulent joinder and misjoinder, occurred more than one
year after the commencement of the action.10 9 The court indicated
that allowing removal after one year from commencement of the
action was a "clear violation of the plain language of § 1446(b)." 110
Yet another court in Wilder v. Isuzu, Inc. applied the plain language
of the statute.' Using the plain language of the statute prevented the
District Court of South Carolina from allowing an equitable
exception to the one-year limitation on removal, even though the
plaintiff told the defendant that they dismissed the non-diverse
defendant from the case only after one year from commencement of
the action had passed."l
2
2. Cases in the Fifth Circuit
Several cases in the Fifth Circuit focused on the strict language of
the statute, preventing the courts from allowing an equitable
exception. 113 For example, the Middle District of Louisiana, in
Hedges v. Hedges Gauging Service, Inc., did not allow an equitable
exception when proceedings were stayed for over six months and the
plaintiff severed claims against non-diverse defendants after one year
had passed. 114 The court determined that Congress should recognize
the exception before the courts do. 15 Moreover, in Jenkins v. Sandoz
108. Amy D. Harmon, Equitable Considerations in Removal: Is One Year the Final Answer?, 16 S.C.
LAW. 28, 30 (2004).
109. Mantz, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10123, at *4-5.
110. Id.; see also Russaw v. Voyager Life Ins. Co., 921 F. Supp. 723, 724-25 (M.D. Ala. 1996)
(disallowing an exception to the one-year time limit on removal, even though the defendant made initial
attempts at removal before one year had run from the commencement of the action, because "the
language of§ 1446(b) contains no exceptions to the one-year limitation").
111. Wilder, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37341, at *7-8.
112. Id.
113. See Hedges v. Hedges Gauging Service, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 753, 755 (M.D. La. 1993); see also
Jenkins v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 965 F. Supp. 861, 869 (N.D. Miss. 1997).
114. Hedges, 837 F. Supp. at 754.
115. Id. at 755.
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Pharmaceuticals Corp., the Northern District of Mississippi did not
allow an equitable exception to the one-year limitation when a federal
court remanded a case to the state court after the plaintiff dismissed
the only two non-diverse defendants from the action. 116 The court
reasoned that "[t]he statutory language is unambiguous in providing
that no diversity case may be removed more than one year after
commencement of the lawsuit."
117
3. Cases in the Tenth Circuit
Additionally, courts in the Tenth Circuit have found an absolute
bar to removal after one year because of the plain language of the
statute and its legislative history. 118 For example, in Caudill v. Ford
Motor Co., the Northern District of Oklahoma enforced an absolute
bar to the one-year time limit on removal when the plaintiff
dismissed the non-diverse defendant one year and six days after filing
suit. 119 The court reasoned that "[t]here is no good reason for a
federal court to 'create' removal jurisdiction outside the one-year
period when the issue could have been addressed before the deadline
set by Congress" and "the Court is constrained by the plain language
of the statute."'
120
V. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SHOULD ESTABLISH A
RULE REGARDING THE ONE-YEAR LIMITATION
The circuit split concerning whether to allow an equitable
exception to the one-year limitation or to treat the one-year limitation
as an absolute bar should be addressed. 121 If some jurisdictions allow
an equitable exception to the time limit while others treat the time
limit as an absolute bar, removal after the one-year limitation has run
116. Jenkins, 965 F. Supp. at 869.
117. Id.
118. See Caudill v. Ford Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1327-28 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
119. Id. at 1326, 1328.
120. Id. at 1328.
121. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 1-4.
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will be based on where the parties are located, which is unfair.122
Moreover, defendants will never know what to expect when it comes
to removal because courts in the same circuit remain split on the
issue. 123 The United States Supreme Court should allow an equitable
exception to the one-year time limit on removal in cases of strategic
joinder, but should treat the one-year time limitation as an absolute
bar in cases of fraudulent joinder. 124
A. An Equitable Exception is Needed in Cases of Strategic Joinder
Courts should allow an equitable exception to the one-year time
limit on removal in cases where a plaintiff joins a party that the
plaintiff has a claim against but where the plaintiff has no intention of
pursuing that claim. The exception in these cases should be allowed
because such strategic joinder is difficult to discover within one year,
the one-year limitation is a procedural limitation, substantial progress
in a trial does not always occur within one year, and the language in
the statute does not expressly prohibit the use of equitable
exceptions. 125
1. Strategic Joinder is Difficult to Discover Within One Year
First, it is difficult, if not impossible, for defendants to discover
strategic joinder until the plaintiff dismisses the party since from the
beginning, the plaintiff has a viable claim against the party.126
Therefore, the plaintiff is allowed to manipulate the court for the sole
reason of preventing removal to federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction. 127 Not only is the plaintiff allowed to manipulate
statutory rules to defeat diversity, plaintiffs are encouraged "to
122. McNew, supra note 16, at 1317.
123. See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
124. Id.
125. See supra Part IV.A.1-4.
126. See discussion supra Part II.B.
127. McNew, supra note 16, at 1316.
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engage in manipulative gamesmanship in order to defeat removal."'
128
Defendants do not have the same opportunity to manipulate the
forum, which is unfair because defendants are much less likely to win
a case in a court in the plaintiffs home state than a case in federal
court. 1
2 9
Plaintiffs should not be allowed to manipulate statutory rules
simply to defeat diversity.' 30  "[A] plaintiff does not possess a
superior 'right' to select the forum of his choice."' 31 By allowing the
plaintiff to manipulate statutory rules through strategic joinder and
prevent removal to federal court, the plaintiff gains a superior choice
of forum which is unfair to the defendant. 132 Moreover, "[r]emoval
does not deprive plaintiffs of any 'right,' but merely affords
defendants an equal opportunity to litigate in federal court."' 13 3 Giving
the defendant an equal opportunity at choosing a forum is important
and fair. 1
34
However, at least one court has asserted that a "[d]efendant's right
to remove and [a] plaintiffs right to choose his forum are not on
equal footing . . ."135 The court in Burns reasoned that "removal
statutes are construed narrowly; where plaintiff and defendant clash
about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand."'1 36
Although removal statutes are construed strictly and narrowly, this
construction does not give plaintiffs the right to manipulate the forum
and avoid removal in cases where the defendant would have the right
128. Id. at 1317; see also Kite v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments, Corp., 761 F. Supp. 597, 601 (S.D.
Ind. 1989).
129. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 606-07.
130. Tedford v. Warner-Lambert, Co., 327 F.3d 423, 428-29 (5th Cir. 2003).
131. Haiber, supra note 77, at 612.
132. Id. at 612, 655.
133. Id. at 611.
134. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 607 (showing that plaintiffs and defendants win at
different rates depending on the court in which the action proceeds).
135. See Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
136. Id.; see also Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440-41 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating "[i]f
there is even a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against
any one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand
the case to the state court.").
20081 1089
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1089 2007-2008
8)  - EAR I I   L 1089 
e  i lative s anship i  r er to defeat re oval.,,128 
ts  t  t   t it  t  i late  
, i  fair se f ants r    li l  t  i  
  rt tiffs     
court. 129 
i tiffs l  l  i late t r  l s 
   ity.130 ] l i tiff t   
i  ' i ht' t  .,,131    
i tiff i l te   i  i r  
t l  i tiff  i r  
    132 l 
i  ti f   i ht,'  l   
 t   l t.,,133  
t t it   t 
fair. 134 
    ant's  
   
.. ,,135 t m l 
  t  
rt i ti  are resolved in favor of remand.,,136 
 
    
   
J .         
  ra  
. .  .  , ir.  
i r, ra t  t  
Jd. t  . 
J at611  
.  l r  is r . pra t  , at   t t l i ti   f t  i  t 
 t i   
 . .  .   (lIt i . . 
. J ; see lso .    .  ( ir. 1 (st ti  "  
is   t  state l  i  t  states   ti  a i t 
one f t  the fe r l c rt t i  that t  s r r   
t  t t . . 
17
Floyd: The One Year Limit on Removal:  An Ace Up the Sleeve of the Unscr
Published by Reading Room, 2008
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to remove if the plaintiff had not strategically joined a non-diverse
party. 1
37
2. The One-Year Limitation is a Procedural Limitation
Second, the one-year time limit imposed on removal is procedural
rather than jurisdictional. 138 Procedural rules are often subject to
equitable exceptions.' 39 Because procedural rules can be subject to
equitable exceptions, the United States Supreme Court should
recognize an equitable exception to the one-year limit on removal in
cases of strategic joinder. 140
However, not all courts agree that the one-year limitation on
removal is a procedural limitation; 141 some courts have determined
the limitation is jurisdictional. 142 If the time limit is interpreted to be
jurisdictional, no equitable exception will be allowed. 143 However, it
is improper to interpret the time limit as jurisdictional because the
one-year time limit is a statute of limitations, which is presumptively
subject to equitable exceptions. 144 In fact, the Supreme Court has held
that "[t]his equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of
limitation."'145  Therefore, because precedent allows equitable
137. See Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2003) (indicating that
plaintiffs should not be allowed to manipulate the forum in order to defeat diversity).
138. See Tedford, 327 F.3d at 426; Kinabrew v. Emco-Wheaton, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 351, 352 (M.D.
La. 1996); Morrison v. Nat'l Benefit Life Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 945, 950 (S.D. Miss. 1995); Barnes v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1992).
139. Tedford, 327 F.3d at 426; see also Irwin v. Department of Veterans, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)
(finding that statutes of limitations which are procedural limitations, are presumptively subject to
equitable exceptions).
140. See Conclusion infra.
141. Price v. Messer, 872 F. Supp. 317, 320 (S.D. W. Va. 1995).
142. Id.
143. Id. (finding that an equitable exception was not allowed to the one-year limitation on removal
when the defendant attempted removal two years after commencement of the action when the plaintiff's
addition of a defendant increased the amount in controversy). The court reasoned that the time limitation
was "a jurisdictional limitation that should be rigidly observed to prevent removal of diversity cases
pending in state court for more than one year." Id.
144. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text; see also Smith v. City of Chicago Heights, 951
F.2d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Equitable tolling 'permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of
limitations if despite all due diligence he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of
his claim."' (quoting Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990)).
145. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946).
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considerations when construing statutes of limitation and the one-
year removal limitation has been construed as a procedural limitation,
equitable exceptions to removal in cases of strategic joinder should
be allowed. 1
46
Further, if statutes of limitations are presumptively subject to
equitable exceptions, other time limits in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) are
subject to waiver.1 47 Thus if one time limit in the statute is subject to
waiver, all other time limits in the statute, including the one-year
limitation on removal, should be subject to an equitable exception.148
3. Substantial Progress in a Trial Does Not Always Occur Within
One Year
Moreover, the point of the one-year time limit is to prevent
"removal after substantial progress has been made in state court.' 49
Whether substantial progress has been made is determined by the
facts of the particular case. 150 However, if substantial progress has
not been made in the trial, an equitable exception should allow
removal after one year in cases of strategic joinder, as was done in
the Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co. case.' 51 In enacting the one-year
limitation, Congress indicated that one year is the time period in
146. See supra notes 141-42, 144 and accompanying text; see also Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co., 298
F. Supp. 2d 422, 429 (W.D. La. 2003) (allowing an equitable exception when a party was strategically
joined); Kite v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments, Corp., 761 F. Supp. 597, 601 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
147. See Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming a district
court decision that the thirty-day time requirement imposed by section 1447(c) is subject to waiver
resulting from noncompliance with 1446(b)).
148. See Ferguson v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 996 F. Supp. 597, 603 (1998) (indicating that one
time limit in a statute cannot be subject to an equitable exception without the other time limits also being
subject to such exceptions).
149. H.R. Rep. No. 100-889 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 USCCAN 5982, 6032; see also Ardoin, 298
F. Supp. 2d at 428; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 886 (5th Cir. 1998).
150. See Ardoin, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 428 (finding that substantial progress had not been made in state
court after fourteen months when "merit discovery ha[d] not commenced, the case ha[d] not been set for
trial, and the class certification hearing ha[d] not been held" while suggesting substantial progress would
have been made if these tasks had been completed).
151. See id. at 428-29 (allowing an equitable exception to the one-year limitation on removal after
finding substantial progress had not been made in fourteen months).
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which substantial progress would be made. 152 Moreover, "[i]t is not
clear that Congress intended to allow these administrative concerns to
override the right to a federal forum when a potential fraud has been
perpetuated on the court," and the "official commentary" sheds little
light on the intent of the provision.'
53
Some courts reason that judicial economy requires the one-year
limitation to be construed as an absolute bar in all cases, whether
substantial progress has been made in state court or not.154 However,
judicial economy should not override fairness to the defendant when
a plaintiff manipulates the forum through the use of strategic joinder
to significantly increase the likelihood the plaintiff will win.
155
4. The Statutory Language Does Not Expressly Prohibit the Use
of Equitable Exceptions
The statutory language in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) does not expressly
indicate that equitable exceptions may not apply to the one-year
limitation in the statute.' 56 Congress would have expressly indicated
that the one-year limitation was an absolute bar if they did not intend
for cases to be removable after one year under any circumstances.
157
As one court pointed out, "[i]f Congress had intended to place a one-
year limitation on removal of all diversity cases, it surely would have
chosen less obscure and counter-intuitive wording to accomplish that
purpose."' 58 Since Congress never explicitly prohibited the use of
equitable exceptions to extend the one-year time limit, courts should
allow an equitable exception allowing defendants to remove to
152. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-889 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 USCCAN 5982, 6032 (stating that the
one-year time limit is intended to "reduc[e] the opportunity for removal after substantial progress has
been made"). Congress never specifically addressed the one-year time limit. McNew, supra note 16, at
1332.
153. Ferguson v. Security Life of Denver Ins. Co., 996 F Supp. 597, 601 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
154. Mantz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10123, at *5-6 (S.D. W. Va.
2003).
155. See Clermont & Eisenberg; supra note 10, at 607 (showing that plaintiffs have a much higher
win rate in state court whereas defendants have a much higher win rate in federal court).
156. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
157. See Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 534-35 (6th Cir. 1999).
158. Id. at 534-35.
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federal court after the one-year limit in cases involving strategic
joinder. 159
However, some courts interpret the statute to be an absolute bar on
removal under all circumstances, asserting the plain language of the
statute indicates a one-year limit on removal in all diversity cases.'
60
One justification for this is Congress' apparent willingness to allow
plaintiffs to strategically join defendants and defeat removal.' 6 '
Moreover, courts interpreting the one-year limit as an absolute bar
think that it is up to Congress, rather than the courts, to rewrite the
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) if they want to allow an equitable
exception. 1
62
B. Absolute Bar is Needed in Cases of Fraudulent Joinder
Defendants should not be able to remove to federal court after the
expiration of one year if the plaintiff fraudulently joined parties
because fraudulent joinder does not prevent removal, fraudulent
joinder is discoverable within one year, and equitable principles only
aid vigilant defendants. 1
63
1. Fraudulent Joinder Does Not Prevent Removal
It is well-established that fraudulently joined defendants cannot
prevent removal. 164 Courts have asserted that fraudulently joined
defendants, for purposes of determining diversity, will not bar
removal to federal courts. 165 Since fraudulent joinder does not
prevent removal, an equitable exception to the one-year time
159. See generally id.
160. See discussion supra Part III.B.
161. See Cofer v. Horsehead Research& Develop. Co., 805 F. Supp. 541,544 (E.D. Tenn. 1991).
162. Id; see also Martine v. Nat'l Tea Co., 841 F. Supp. 1421, 1422 (M.D. La. 1993); Hedges v.
Hedges, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 753, 755 (M.D. La. 1993).
163. See discussion infra Part V.B.1-2.
164. See Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 541 (1939); see also Heritage Bank v. Redcom Labs.,
Inc., 250 F.3d 319, 323 (5th Cir.) (stating that removal is not precluded if a non-diverse party is
fraudulently joined).
165. See Pullman, 305 U.S. at 541, Heritage Bank, 250 F.3d at 323; Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d
457, 460-63 (4th Cir. 1999); Gottlieh v. Westin Hotel Co., 990 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1993).
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limitation should not be allowed to aid defendants failing to remove
on a fraudulent joinder basis before the time limitation has expired. 166
2. Fraudulent Joinder is Discoverable Within One Year
Defendants are able to discover and make fraudulent joinder
arguments before the one year limitation expires. 167 By making these
arguments, defendants can use fraudulent joinder as a defense.' 68 If
the defendant is successful in showing that the plaintiff fraudulently
joined a non-diverse party, the non-diverse party will be dismissed
from the action, and the defendant will be allowed to remove to
federal court. 169 Because fraudulent joinder allows diverse defendants
to have the non-diverse defendants dismissed before the one year
statutory period expires, they should not be allowed to remove after
the period has run. 1
70
3. Equity Aids the Vigilant
Regardless of whether the one-year time limit is properly
construed as a procedural limitation,171 a defendant should not be
allowed an equitable exception to removal outside of the one-year
time limit imposed on removal in cases of fraudulent joinder.' 72
166. See discussion infra Part V.B.2.
167. See Caudill v. Ford Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1328 (N.D. Okla. 2003) (noting that the
defendants "could have made [their] fraudulent joinder argument before the end of the statutory period"
and removed the case to federal court); Clark v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 04-1537, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14224, at *5-6 (E.D. La., July 22, 2004) (finding that the defendant was not vigilant in asserting the
right to removal when they "knew or should have known that the amount in controversy exceeded the
minimum for diversity jurisdiction" before the one-year time limit had passed).
168. See Laura 1. Ashbury, A Practical Guide to Fraudulent Joinder in the Eighth Circuit, 57 ARK. L.
REv. 913,913, 917 (2005).
169. Hill v. Delta Int'l Machinery Corp., 386 F. Supp. 2d 427, 430 (S.D.N.Y 2005); Mills v.
Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2001) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron &
Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92 (1921)).
170. See Caudill, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1328 (noting that there was "no good reason for a federal court to
'create' removal jurisdiction outside the one-year period when the issue could have been addressed
before the deadline set by Congress").
171. See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
172. See Caudill, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1328; Ferguson v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 996 F. Supp.
597, 603 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (finding that the defendant was not deserving of an equitable exception
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Further, courts have indicated "equity aids the vigilant and not those
who slumber on their rights., 173 As defendants are able to discover
fraudulent joinder prior to the expiration of the one-year limit on
removal, defendants failing to discover fraudulent joinder prior to the
expiration are not vigilant and should not be rewarded with an
extension of the removal period. 1
74
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court should "find a way to right the
wrongs of forum manipulation."'1 75 If some courts allow an equitable
exception to the time limit while others treat the time limit as an
absolute bar, removal after one year from commencement of the
action will depend on a party's location, which is unfair.'
76
Moreover, parties will never know what to expect as to removal when
court splits exist even within circuits.177 Thus, the United States
Supreme Court should determine whether the one-year time
limitation on removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is subject to equitable
exceptions or whether it is an absolute bar on removal after the one
year limit.' 7
8
In determining the correct rule, the Court should consider both
fraudulent joinder and strategic joinder. 179  When a plaintiff
strategically joins a non-diverse party, the Court should allow
because the defendant should have attempted removal before one-year; they would have known
fraudulent joinder was an issue at the outset had they been vigilant).
173. See, e.g., National Assoc. of Gov't Employees v. Public Service Board, 40 F.3d 698, 708 (5th
Cir. 1994) (quoting NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131, 137 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)); Ferguson, 996 F. Supp. at 603; Caudill, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1328; Clark, No. 04-1537, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14224, at *5-6 (finding that the defendant was not vigilant in asserting the right to
removal when they "knew or should have known that the amount in controversy exceeded the minimum
for diversity jurisdiction" before the one-year time limit had passed); Hill, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 431
(finding that the defendant had plenty of time to remove prior to the expiration of one year by asserting
the doctrine of fraudulent joinder).
174. Hill, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 433.
175. McNew, supra note 16, at 1344.
176. See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See discussion supra Part IL1.A-B.
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equitable exceptions to the one-year time limit on removal because
strategic joinder is difficult for defendants to discover within the one-
year limit for removal, and a plaintiff should not be allowed to
manipulate the forum or have a superior choice of forum at the
defendant's expense. 180 However, when a plaintiff fraudulently joins
a non-diverse party, the Court should treat the one-year time
limitation as an absolute bar to removal because defendants are able
to discover such joinder prior to the expiration of the one-year
limit.18 1 If defendants do not attempt removal based on fraudulent
joinder before the one-year limitation expires, they are not being
vigilant and should not be allowed to reap the benefits of an equitable
exception to the statute. 
182
The United States Supreme Court should take the opportunity to
resolve the judicial disagreements regarding 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) so
that plaintiffs, defendants, and courts will be able to follow an
established rule regarding removal, aiding in judicial efficiency and
fairness for all involved.'
83
Katherine L. Floyd
180. See discussion supra Part W.A. 1-4.
181. See discussion supra Part W.B. 1-2.
182. Id.
183. See Mantz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10123, at *5-6 (S.D. W.
Va., June 13, 2003) (indicating that judicial economy is important); Clermont & Eisenberg. supra note
10, at 607 (showing that defendants have a much higher statistical chance of winning a diversity case
that has been removed to federal court).
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